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I believe that research should be refuted by research. More and more of our
scarce journal space is being taken up by attacks, rebuttals, and rebuttals to the
rebuttals, often ending with a whimper of recognition that the adversaries were not
so very far apart to begin with, and that the only way (if possible) to resolve the
disagreement is through empirical research. Communication of scientific disagree-
ment does not require a published article. Grant proposals and manuscripts submit-
ted to refereed journals like this one are sent out to reviewers, who provide written
evaluations that are communicated to the author. Papers presented at conferences
are evaluated and often criticized by discussants and members of the audience. The
best strategy, I think, is direct communication between the critic and the author.
Unlike the published criticism, this method allows both critic and author to reach
a clear understanding of each other's position, to identify specific topics of agreement
and disagreement, and perhaps even to arrive at possible resolutions through the
normal give and take of scientific dialogue. The best a published criticism can do
is to provide an opportunity for back-to-back monologues, surely a far less effective
means of communication.
I also feel that the attack-and-rebuttal format gives too much of an advantage
to the critic at the expense of the original author, who, after all, is the one who
put in all the hard work of carrying out the research in the first place. The critic
gets to define the time line, taking as long as she or he wants to work on the critique,
consulting with other like-minded scholars, and sending it off when it is ready. The
author is often completely unaware that any such critique is in the works until it
arrives in the mailbox with a letter from the editor graciously offering the author
a chance to reply to the criticism, and asking that the reply be sent back within 3
weeks or a month. Very few of us are sitting around wondering how we are going
to occupy ourselves for the next month. Students are waiting for grades or recom-
mendations or feedback on their dissertations, committees are faced with urgent
decisions, families demand attention, and we are already past the deadline on
several other commitments. The author is forced to drop everything and respond
immediately, or forego the opportunity to respond, leaving the readers to conclude
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that the critique must be devastatingly accurate, since the author could come up
with no defense.
The Adversarial Forum is a useful forum for the expression of opinions about
general issues of theory, method, application, and policy. The general controversy
over the so-called "litigation crisis" and the real or imagined escalation in damage
awards would be a fine topic for an Adversarial Forum. I would not like to see the
Forum turn into a platform for attacks on individual research studies.
Every empirical study has flaws. Almost every author exaggerates the signifi-
cance of the problem studied, overstates the implications of the results, or both.
The Hastie, Schkade, and Payne study is no exception. As authors we make unsub-
stantiated claims, as readers we recognize them, and are unlikely to be fooled.
Vidmar is quite right that we cannot be confident that the conclusions drawn by
Hastie and his colleagues are true, but of course his critique provides no evidence
that they are not.
But perhaps the Hastie, Schkade, and Payne study had particularly serious
weaknesses that somehow slipped by the editor and the reviewers and that would
not be apparent to readers. Perhaps it was not up to the usual standards of Law
and Human Behavior. If this were the case, some people might believe that a
published criticism was warranted, although I would not be one of them.
There are many strengths to the study. The participants were not college
students, but an unusually representative sample of 726 jury-eligible citizens. To
enhance generalizability, four different stimulus cases were used, all based on real
cases, two of which were originally decided by juries. The researchers examined
both the verdicts of individual jurors and the verdicts of deliberating juries, looking
for correlates of both. The jury deliberations were videotaped, transcribed, and
carefully analyzed in an attempt to understand the individual and group processes
by which juries reached their decisions. In fact, the methodology of this study is
superior to that of most published jury studies. If this study warrants a published
criticism, then so do dozens of others, and we run the risk of turning Law and
Human Behavior into a journal with as many critiques as reports of original research.
There are also weaknesses in the study, although as usual the reviewers dis-
agreed about which were the most important. For what it's worth, in my opinion
the most serious problem is that the jurors were not given the chance to decide
compensatory damages, only punitive damages. Making both decisions, as real
juries do, may make the distinctions between compensatory and punitive damages
more noticeable, thereby improving accuracy of recall. In addition, the opportunity
to make substantial compensatory damage awards might have restrained jurors'
motivation to make large punitive damage awards. In this study, the information
about the prior compensatory damage awards was not very salient; for example,
participants were not told how much money the plaintiffs had already been awarded.
Whether this change in procedure would actually make a difference is of course
an empirical question, one that I hope Hastie will address in follow-up research.
The 5% accuracy rate for memory for the law also raised questions in my mind.
Jury researchers are well aware that jurors' inability to understand the law is their
greatest weakness, but 5% accuracy is conspicuously worse than even the usual poor
performance level, and requires some explanation. Were the questions unusually
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difficult, the scoring particularly stringent, or what? Is there reason to believe that
this reflects an actual substantive difference, or might it be methodological? This
startling number deserved more attention in the original write-up, and deserves
more careful exploration in follow-up research.
As for Vidmar's central criticism—that real juries would never be asked to
make these decisions in the first place—the problem is that in two of these cases
they were asked to make these decisions. Maybe the fault is in the gatekeeping
function the judges are supposed to exercise, and maybe the juries did badly because
they never should have been asked to make decisions like these, but whether the
problem is that juries are reversed because the task is too hard for them or because
they are given inappropriate cases does not have much practical significance. Its
theoretical significance depends on whether juries do well in appropriate cases and
poorly in inappropriate ones. Neither the original study nor the critique sheds any
light on this question.
Would it have been better to include cases where the courts held that punitive
damages were appropriate? Sure. If the juries decided that the damages were not
appropriate then it would look as though juries may be generally incompetent to
decide punitive damages as the task is currently structured. If the juries agreed that
damages were appropriate, then it would look as though juries may have a proplain-
tiff bias, deciding for the plaintiff whether or not that was the right decision. Such
a study could illuminate the specific nature of the jury's incompetence; it could not
provide evidence for jury competence. If this additional question were addressed
in a balanced design it would require a total of 1,452 participants, rather more than
we typically require in a single journal article. Just as every study has flaws, every
study necessarily leaves some questions unanswered.
And of course Hastie did not design this study to answer all possible questions
about the way juries decide punitive damages. Hastie, Schkade, and Payne is just
one study in a program of research. Different cases are used in other studies in the
series, and different questions are asked. The basic idea of systematic replication
and extension is to provide convergent validity, using a variety of designs and
procedures that compensate for each other's weaknesses, relying on later studies
to address the questions left unanswered in the earlier ones, and testing the general-
ity of the results with different subject populations and stimulus materials. When
an author has conducted several studies on the same topic, the critic has an obligation
to consider the whole body of research, rather than singling out just one study. The
reader of Vidmar's critique would never know that there are other studies in the
series. Perhaps Vidmar himself did not know, but that just reinforces my original
point that dialogue is a far more useful method than published critiques for resolving
scientific disputes.
Finally, I want to take issue with Vidmar's statement that "judgment following
verdict, appellate review, and private settlement between the parties provide effec-
tive and legal and pragmatic constraints on wayward jury verdicts" (p. 705). I do
not trust the argument that discovery and correction of errors in initial decisions
is evidence that the system is working as it should be. Undoubtedly this mistrust
stems from my work on capital punishment. Since executions resumed in the late
1970s, dozens of people have been released after years on death row because the
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initial decision that they were guilty turned out to be a mistake. Prosecutors make
pious claims that the discovery of the mistake while the defendant was still alive
is evidence that "the system is working." But mistakes are extremely costly even
when they are not deadly. Much more important, we have no way of knowing how
many mistakes are never corrected.
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